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Abstract. It is argued that a concept of evaluation of animal models that is broader and more useful than
validation is available. Productive generativity refers to the degree to which a model furthers understanding and
leads to more-effective treatment interventions. Results of the application of this novel evaluative frame to
several animal models of eating disorders show that this animal-based research has not been productive. The
question of the relation between clinic and animal laboratory is discussed.

Introduction
How can we assess the value of animal models in medical and psychological research? This
is primarily a problem of method — of developing rigorous evaluative tools. The focus in this
paper is not on the question of the value of research, but on how to evaluate it. Obviously, an
appropriate method must be open to finding any level of value, high or low.
We are concerned here only with science-based, not ethics-based, arguments
regarding the use of animals in research. A science-based argument needs a scientific method
to back its assertions in the current debate over animal research. Of course, all science-based
arguments imply an ethical position. Among the several available philosophies on the issue
— rights, utilitarian, social contract, feminist, communitarian — most science-based
arguments assume some form of utilitarian ethic, in that they try to assess benefits to humans
and costs to the non-human animals. The act of doing animal research is judged right or
wrong exclusively by the test of usefulness.
For all but utilitarian philosophers, usefulness or value is, of course, a relative and
limited consideration. To show that animal model research is useful is not necessarily to
show it is justifiable. For example, for most people, invasive research on humans, although
likely to be useful, is not justifiable. In addition, to show that animal model research was
useful in the past, does not necessarily imply it was, or is, the most useful form of
investigation. To show that some animal model research was useful, does not speak to the
likelihood that most was not useful, and that some was harmful because it misled us.
With these constraints on the criterion of usefulness, the present paper addresses the
problem of how to assess the utilitarian value of animal research. The focus is on animal
model-based medical research (including psychological research). The paper describes a
battery of available social scientific analytical methods supplemented by historical methods.
The present author’s background is in the social science side of psychology. For the sake of
full disclosure, in ethics the author is a rightist. I hold that some animals other than humans,
because they have inherent value, have basic rights which preclude their use in most medical
and psychological research.
The present method is needed, because usefulness is not typically being assessed or
assessed adequately in the scientific literature. Lafollette and Shanks end their theoretical
analysis of the problem of assessment in their recent book, Brute Science [1], with a plea for
further efforts to “assess the scientific value of animal experimentation. Until we do, we will
be left with a vague version of the intellectually untenable ‘it just works’ argument.” To
contribute to the effort to “find ways to determine the contribution of animal experimentation
to human well-being, especially in comparison to contributions derived from alternative
research methods” is the intent of this present paper.

I will review some of the available literature on assessment, to extricate methods
used, describe a battery of evaluative tools and show their application to a set of animal
models, and will end with a few policy recommendations at the level of animal care
committees. Along the way, I will suggest that validation is not a sufficient means of
assessment of the value of animal research.
Literature review
I am spending significant time with earlier approaches, because they have not
received much serious attention as methods and the present method has been described more
fully elsewhere [2].
Some of the publications that purport to evaluate animal research are merely
assertory, being not much more than lists of claims of benefits to humans or costs to animals.
In my own field, Miller [3] provides a description of gains in effective treatment and in
understanding of various psychological disorders that he claims derive from animal models.
However, he provides virtually no evidence for those claims, and is frankly dismissive about
costs to the animals. Miller notwithstanding, the simple presence of an animal model for a
particular disorder itself provides no scientific evidence of the value or usefulness of the
research based on it.
On the other side, Doncaster [4] and Diner [5] provide lists of procedures involving
animals that are claimed by them to be costly to the animals, with virtually no discussion of
possible benefits to humans. These studies are merely catalogues and, from the point of view
of the present review of methods, are pre-methodological.
A number of authors have attempted to evaluate animal research by using historically
based methods [6–9]). Paton distinguishes between the gains of increased knowledge and of
applications. He also offers a historical method, but it is flawed and really begs the question
of how to evaluate animal research. In his “method of deletion”, we would first identify what
we have learned from animal research and then suppose that it is removed, in order to obtain
a perspective on benefits. However, of course, identifying what we have learned is the crux of
the problem. As I will discuss shortly, the literature in the history of science on the locus of
discovery indicates that sorting out grossly between laboratory-based and clinic-based loci is
difficult. Further, removing alleged benefits from animal research without replacing it with
the benefits of whatever alternative scientific approach took its place is, even in the context of
this imaginary exercise, illogical. For example, Drewett and Kani [10] argue that, in the field
of psychology, cognitive-based therapies would have come earlier if animal-based
behaviouristic psychology had not been so dominant.
The efforts of these scientists with historical bents have fostered some historically
grounded discussion of the role of animal research in such controversial areas as the
discovery of insulin treatment for diabetes, the development of understanding and prevention
of polio, and the thalidomide tragedy. However, clearly we need to enlist the historians of
science to enter the dense thicket of events surrounding these developments, discoveries, and
mis-steps, and to help us to disentangle the claims and blames so often inflated by people on
both sides of the issue.
Turning to early studies that are serious efforts at scientific methods of evaluation,
one strategy employed can be called “most important advances.” Stephens analysed Nobel
Prize winners in physiology and medicine [11]. He categorised the work occasioning the
awards as animal-based or alternative-based, by using Russell and Burch’s concept for the
latter category. He found that two-thirds of them used alternative methods. He also found that
the relative percentage of alternative to animal research increased in recent years (up to

1985). Leader and Stark [12] also used Nobel Prize winners as an evaluative entry, but they
failed to distinguish between animal and alternative methods.
In their 1975 study, Comroe and Dripps [13] employed an ambitious method to
evaluate the origin of important gains in medicine. Grossly, they had specialists select the 10
most important advances in cardiac/pulmonary medicine out of a list of nominated advances.
Then judges selected studies that contained the requisite body of knowledge for these
advances. These studies were categorised as laboratory-based or clinic-based. The method
has serious limitations from a social scientific point of view. For example, the bias of the
judges is a serious problem, and one not simply resolved. In principle as well as in practice, it
is difficult to locate judges that are both expert enough to select “essential bodies of
knowledge” and yet are not either committed to laboratory or clinical approaches to research.
Comroe and Dripps did not address this problem. However, in his study of the problem of
elucidating locus of discovery, Reines [14] found a clear bias of clinicians to view the clinic
and of basic scientists to view the laboratory, respectively, as the premier locus. He also
found that claims of accidental discovery are inflated. More often, there is a considerable
background of research which then leads to discovery. Teasing out the role of animals in that
requisite background is difficult. Noting that the image of the serendipitous breakthrough of
the lone scientist in the laboratory is a romanticised view, Reines takes the position that much
discovery first occurs in the clinic, while later research in the laboratory has a merely
demonstrative and graphic function.
The relatively new field of the sociology of knowledge offers general support for
Reines’ views. The description of science that emerges is of a process that is much messier
than that provided in accounts by traditional philosophers of science. In place of a rationally
driven process with strict rules of evidence and proof, Latour [15] and others describe a
subculture of research where what occurs and what is credited as scientific facts (including
those constituting significant advances) are largely intelligible as social constructions. It is a
human enterprise where personalities, ambitions, and personal and political connections play
significant roles.
In any case, the “most important advance” is an important advance over the premethod approach of Miller and others. However, this approach really begs the question of
how to evaluate the great preponderance of past, present, and proposed studies that clearly
have produced or will produce no important advances. It is hardly arguable that the animal
model strategy has not had some positive pay-off. Obviously, thousands of PhDs, over a
period of 40 years, spending tens of billions of dollars (US) studying hundreds of millions of
non-human animals in models of every conceivable medical and psychological disorder,
produce some “important advances.” What is at issue is not whether there have been at least
some important advances in which animal research has played a role, but whether this is the
most effective strategy. In addition to important advances, we need to consider wasted
studies, wasted animals, mis-leads, and roads not taken through alternative and clinical
methods.
Finally, I review here methods that employ the strategy of assessing both benefits and
costs to evaluate animal model research. The Institute of Medical Ethics report describes
features that should be taken into account in assessing potential benefits [16]. It includes
social as well as purely scientific benefits. Under scientific concerns, they include quality of
the proposed research — experimental design, necessity, and validity of procedures. This
descriptive, but not yet quantitative scheme, is valuable, and the present method builds on it.
Kelly [17] and Giannelli [18], independently, in their responses to the Miller article
mentioned earlier, use forms of citation analysis to evaluate animal model research. Giannelli
notes the number of references cited by Miller as beneficial studies that appear in a popular
licensure examination for psychologists. He finds the number to be small, at 5.9%. Kelly

examines the number of all citations in two high quality academic journals in one year that
are reports of animal-based research, and finds low numbers, 0.003% and 2%. Both of these
studies are methodological gains, but do not employ full citation analyses.
To conclude this review of the literature on evaluative methods, it suggests the
importance of distinguishing between global, paradigm-specific, and study-specific
evaluations. The pitfalls of assessment at the global level is that it tends to be merely
assertory in making claims of benefits, it provides no middle range evaluation, and no way of
assessing a particular study. This is unacceptable, because it is likely that most research
contributes little, given the costs to the animals involved. Global approaches such as “most
important advances” methods too readily lead to the sweeping premise that, since some
animal research has been valuable, all of it is. This truncates the evaluation of any given or
proposed study. Brody [19] offers this criticism in her analysis of the review system in the
United States. We need methods that can evaluate any proposed study at the point of funding
or animal review committee consideration.
Scope and terms of the present study
Before presenting a method consisting of a battery of analytical tools to that end, a few
definitions are helpful. The method is intended for both medical and psychological animal
model research, and we must be clear what this intended object of evaluation is and what it is
not.
The distinction between medical and psychological research is a blurred one.
Psychologists do physiology, and the field has several physiological subfields —
physiological psychology, neuropsychology, and psychoneuroimmunology. Both enterprises
have similar funding resources and use the same nomenclature for describing disorders. In the
clinic, some psychological disorders have a physiological cause, some physiological
disorders have a psychological cause, and all have psychological complications.
Another distinction that, upon closer examination, is blurred, is basic versus applied
research. The intent of basic research is to add to the general understanding of biological
processes, while the intent of applied research is to add to effective intervention (both
preventative and direct treatment) regarding a particular human function or disordered
function, and to understanding of that disorder. However, the effort to understand a particular
disorder often involves investigation of general biological and psychological processes. In
these terms, most animal model research is mixed, largely applied, but often, in part, basic
also.
To concretise this, consider, as we will more fully below, an animal model of a human
eating disorder. While the intent of much research with this model is to add to the
understanding and treatment/prevention of bulimia or anorexia in humans, some research
with the models aims at furthering understanding of eating, appetite, and satiation
mechanisms at a fairly basic level of general biological function.
A similar argument about the blurring of applied and basic research apparently applies
to toxicology research. While identification of toxins is a focus and has a direct applied end,
toxicologists are also concerned with the mechanisms underlying, or the causes of, toxic
reactions, and can pursue these at a basic level of research.
The fact of this blurring is important in the present context of evaluation of animal
research, for there is some inclination to presume that basic research occupies a privileged
region, that it is less accessible to evaluation, and therefore, is less accountable; or worse, that
it is in principle less accountable, because it is basic.
Another term that needs clarification is “model.” A model is an analogue. It is not the
thing itself. It is similar to but not identical with what is being modelled. This is definitional,

but it is also arguable on theoretical grounds. LaFollette and Shanks [1] argue this for both
evolutionary and systems theory, concluding that there are necessarily systemic disanalogies
across species.
If it is only analogous, why do we use models? After all, one ideal of experimental
science is the direct observation of the phenomenon of interest, not of some analogue of it.
Why do we give up direct observation? The traditionally given reasons concern control,
access, manipulation, and ethics. Another reason is that comparisons between two merely
analogous phenomena helps us to think - it has a generative or heuristic function.
However, in response to the violation of the ideal of direct observation inherent in the
animal model strategy, some maintain that animal models are not really that — that they do
present the object under study for direct observation — forgetting that a disorder induced in
an animal of a different species in a laboratory setting can never be more than more or less
similar to that actual disorder in a human setting.
The proper function of a model is to help the scientist to think. We learn from
differences as well as from similarities. Consider the animals of a species that, despite
significant similarities, do not get a disorder that animals of a similar species do. Clearly, we
might learn from comparisons between the model and the modelled.
Productive generativity refers to advances in understanding and advances in
intervention, following Paton. Validation refers to the relative match between the model and
the modelled. If the match is close, the model is validated. If it is not, or not in some critical
ways, it is invalidated. Models can be quite similar to the modelled (a high-fidelity model)
and thus validated, but still nothing new has been gained from the model. Conversely, the
model can be quite different from the modelled (a low-fidelity model) and thus readily
invalidated, but advances in understanding and/or intervention can still be occasioned by the
research with the model. So a high-fidelity model can be low in productive generativity
although readily validated, while a low-fidelity model can be high in productive generativity
although readily invalidated. To reiterate, validation does not require that new knowledge or
a new intervention has been discovered through the model. A validated model is not
necessarily a productively generative one.
Method
To measure generative productivity (understanding and intervention), the method applies a
battery of tests to evaluate the cost and benefits a body of research on eating disorders. The
battery includes outcome study, citation analysis, survey, and a measure of pain, stress, and
harm to animal subjects. These familiar quantitative methods are supplemented by informal
historical inquiry. Outcome studies are sophisticated methods developed largely for
programme evaluation. Typically, they involve several measures of an intervention before
and at several points after its occurrence. There are several outcome studies of the
effectiveness of the treatment of eating disorders in the literature (for example, Hsu [20]).
Citation analysis is a measure of the frequency that published studies are mentioned in
subsequent publications in the entire scientific literature. A refined version of citation
analysis distinguishes varying qualities of the citation — is the cited study just mentioned in
the review of literature, or were substantive or methodological findings influential in the
citing study? Surveys are not as simple as they appear, and depend on the report of other
people. When carefully done, they provide significant corroborating data.
There are several “pain scales” in the literature. I selected one developed specifically
to rate the pain, distress, and harm done to animals in psychological research [21].
I applied this battery of measures to animal models of eating disorders, because it has
been recognised, in recent decades, that they are major psychological disorders of near

epidemic proportion; the history of models developed and being developed goes back over
two decades; the research does not have to be inherently painful or invasive (as in pain
research); and, finally there have been no animal rights campaigns targeting researchers in
this area.
The three animal models of eating disorders (ED) evaluated are the sham
feeding and tail pinch models of bulimia, and the activity wheel model of anorexia. Bulimia
involves recurrent episodes of bingeing and purging; self-starvation characterises anorexia. In
both these ED, the client typically is a female adolescent or young adult who is preoccupied
with her body-shape and weight. In sham feeding, the investigator surgically makes a hole in
the wall of the stomach of a rat, dog, or non-human primate. This allows the investigator to
feed the animal through the mouth and siphon off the food before it is fully digested. In this
way, analogous to bingeing-purging, the individual “eats without calories”. The tail pinch
model features the importance of stress in bulimia, while the activity wheel mimics the role
of exercise in the production and/or maintenance of anorexia.
Results
A review of treatment outcome studies shows that ED remain relatively intransigent to
intervention. Treatments are only modestly and temporarily effective. Although there are
some initial gains from treatment, these are limited to a reduction in the frequency of
symptoms such as bingeing-purging, and relapse rates are high. To the limited degree that
they are effective, the most common psychotherapy employed, cognitive-behavioural
therapy, does not derive from animal models of these disorders.
While emphasising investigation of physiological mechanisms and the search for
pharmacological treatments, the research involving these models has yielded no effective
drug treatment to date. Fenfluramine, a drug earlier explored in research on obesity, was
found to be ineffective in the treatment of bulimia, and was recently pulled off the market
because it produced abnormalities in heart valves. Anti-depressant drugs are effective within
the limits described, but they do not derive from these animal models.
As mentioned, citation analysis provides a measure of the frequency that published
studies are mentioned in subsequent publications. Studies published on these three animal
models by nine investigators were cited 0.69 times per year during the nine-year period
considered (1986–1994). In comparison, the average annual frequency of all the references in
the Science Citation Index is 1.87, or more than 2.5 times the rate of those examined in the
present study. When only those citations judged significant are counted (cited only in a
generalised introduction), the overall annual frequency drops to 0.31, i.e. 7 of 10 studies
receive no significant citation in a given year.
A survey of clinicians specialising in the treatment of ED found that 60% did not
know animal models of ED existed; 67% could not name or describe any model; 87% could
not identify or describe the sham feeding model; and 87% indicated that animal models of
ED did not influence their treatment approach. There was no overlap in the list of journals
these specialists indicated they found “most helpful” in their work and those in which the
studies of the nine investigators’ were cited.
Application of the Invasiveness Scale found that these animal studies typically
involve considerable pain, distress, and harm. The scale rates common experimental
procedures on a 6-point scale, ranging from 0 to 5 (highest level). While it was developed to
score psychological research, the scale correlates significantly with other, more-general pain
scales. The models studied scored in the 3 and 4 range, which is consistent with the levels of
invasiveness found in the field of psychology as a whole. For example, in the sham feeding
model, animals are subjected to surgery, the distress of recovery, and harm and distress of a

permanent fistula which produces chronic indigestion. Further, many of the additional
variables tested add to the level of invasiveness — brain lesioning, implanting electrodes into
muscles involved in ingestion, and food deprivation.
Informal historical inquiry reveals that these models already existed in the laboratory
as models of other disorders and as experimental procedures. They do not derive from direct
observation of the clinical phenomena under study. For example, sham feeding is a procedure
that has been used in the study of digestive physiology since the late 19th century [22]. The
activity wheel was originally used as a model of ulcers. Tail-pinching has been used to induce
stress, and was explored, at one time, as a model of schizophrenia.
The analogy between the model and the actual disorder is coarse, being based only on
limited similarity. Sham feeding is only roughly analogous to binge-purge behaviour, as is
the activity wheel to the inclination to over-exercise in anorexics. Tail-pinching produces
stress, a generalised precursor to many, if not most, psychological disorders.
The ED animal model research emphasises physiological processes and the search for
pharmacological treatment, although strong evidence points to a cultural basis of the
disorders (the “slimming culture”). Finally, there is a preoccupation with developing
technology and instrumentation. Investigators report on the development of metabolic
chambers, tethering devices, wire implants, micro-lesioning, computer-based recording of
neural and metabolic events, but provide little description of features of the disorders based
on direct observation in their clinical settings.
A number of findings, taken together suggest that the animal model strategy, in
practice, does not have enough intercourse with the clinic — it is ingrown. The source of
models is based on already existing procedures in the laboratory, rather than on close
observation and intimacy with the clinical phenomena; the relevant clinicians are unfamiliar
with the models; there are limited validation efforts and these are largely internal to the
laboratory enterprise (other models and relevant variables in the laboratory literature); and
there are limited, if any, efforts to evaluate productive generativity.
Related applications and research
In the course of this study on ED models, I also informally examined models of aggression.
There is a significant range of such models, which differ largely in the locus at which the
induction of aggression occurs. Examples here are ordered from central to distal — drug
induced (amphetamine, dopamine, anxiogenics), alcohol-induced, brain lesion (septal), pain,
shock, conflict, conditioned suppression drinking conflict model, isolation (child abuse),
frustration, cold, restraint, intruder. My impression is that these models are also low in
productivity and, certainly, high in cost to the animals.
Dagg [23] used a method of flagging individual experiments on the basis of citation
analysis, numbers of animals used, and invasive procedures. For example, a study with few
citations, large numbers of animals used, and invasive procedures would receive three flags.
By scoring large samples of these and noting university affiliation, journal published, and
funding source, an investigator could compare universities, journals, and funding sources in
terms of relative number of flagged experiments. Dagg scored 155 experiments by Canadian
researchers published in 1990 in 14 journals devoted to animal research in psychology and
neurophysiology. She found a large number of rarely cited experiments. On the basis of her
work, she recommends that animal care committees and funding agencies use more-stringent
criteria and require that applicants include a record of citations for each previously published
study on related topics, particularly those using the same model or paradigm; she
recommends pilot studies, particularly in studies involving large numbers of animals and
highly invasive procedures.

A recent major survey of the attitudes of 4000 psychologists toward animal research,
published in American Psychologist, found that 92% of psychologists who are primarily
practitioners indicated that they rarely, never, or only occasionally used findings from
psychological research on animals [24]. This result corroborates the results of my survey of
specialists in ED. Incidentally, 95% indicated that a ban on animal research would not
seriously hamper there work.
Recommendations
I have already reported recommendations from Dagg, emphasising relevant citation analyses
and pilot studies for investigations at risk in terms of numbers of animals and high
invasiveness
On the basis of my study, I have the following recommendations:
1) encourage independent investigators with expertise in using the above methods to assess
the productive generativity of existing models;
2) animal review committees should alert researchers to the body of searchable literature
produced by these enquiries;
3) animal researchers should conduct validation studies in the narrow sense, by formally
testing the hypothesis of similarity between model and modelled; and
4) in conclusion, more broadly, the scientific community should be open to the possibility
that the animal model research strategy is not the best available approach, on the grounds
of both productive generativity and ethical considerations.
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